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Abstract—IoT technology allows people to connect to and
control devices remotely anywhere and anytime. However,
serious concerns are raised over access control of sensitive IoT
devices (e.g. portable health device) and personal information
pertaining to them. The static access control model used in
conventional system, which does not take into account the
profile and behaviour of the agent requesting access to the
system to determine the risk associated with the request, does
not fit well to be used in some scenarios of some IoT application
domains (e.g. smart healthcare). In this paper, we propose
an adaptive risk-aware access control and the integration of
this concept into the existing access control models, such as
attribute-based and privacy-aware role-based access control.
The proposed model is designed to address both security and
privacy concerns for data sharing in IoT system. A prototype
of the access control system implemented in XACML based on
the proposed model is also presented in this paper.
Keywords-adaptive; risk-aware; access control; IoT;
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT offers the capability to connect the physical world
(represented by physical objects) to the virtual world (rep-
resented by the Internet). Although cross-linking of devices
offers new possibilities to influence and to exchange, this can
also lead to potential risks concerning information security
and both privacy and data protection [12]. The severity of
each risk will depend on the circumstances in which each IoT
application is deployed. For example, in smart healthcare,
which is used to observe the daily health of patient or a
system used to track the movement of patient/ elderly people,
needs more attention since it deals with private information
as well as personal security. In general, most communications
in IoT occur automatically- devices decide to exchange data
with their environment, potentially without user being aware
of it. The failure to correctly control access to devices and
information pertaining to them can lead to severe information
security and privacy risk.
As IoT research and technology is not yet mature enough
[12], there is no standard and unique mechanism to ensure
proper security of both devices and data. The challenges that
IoT are facing, such as scalability, availability, manageability
and security, are still open and need to be addressed. In this
paper, we tackle the security aspect and access control in
particular. We argue that the conventional access control (AC)
models, such as ACL (access control list) [9], role-based
access control (RBAC) [9], attribute-based access control
(ABAC) [9] and organisation-based access control (OrBAC)
[9] do not respond to the access control requirements
(see Section II) in IoT, which promotes the openness and
collaboration where information is more exposed to attacks
compared with closed system [6]. An adaptive and dynamic
access control, that takes into account user’s profile and
behaviour to determine the risk associated with the access
request, is required to affectively address the concerns of
access control in IoT. There is an important concept in our
proposed access control model that is adaptive risk-aware.
Adaptive risk-aware is a method of applying varying levels
of stringency to access control based on the likelihood that
access to a given user could result in its being compromised.
As the level of risk increases, the access control enforcement
process becomes more comprehensive and restrictive. In
adaptive access control, different level of enforcement is
applied to access request for different situation and context in
order to minimise the risk associated with request if granted.
In our approach, each risk is measured by a value, which is
expressed in access control policy and the access permission
is granted based on that estimated risk value. The access
restriction in the form of policy enforcement may be applied
adaptively based on the estimated risk value.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents
the access control scenarios and requirements in IoT. A
comparison between different existing AC models against
defined AC requirements is also discussed in this section.
Section III is about risk model. Section IV presents the
adaptive risk-aware access control models. Section V talks
about access control system prototype and implementation
of such prototype in Java based on XACML [14] policy
language. Section VI presents the related work. Section VII
is the conclusion and future work.
II. ACCESS CONTROL SCENARIOS AND REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we present some access scenarios in IoT
where threats are apparently prominent following by access
control requirements. Two requirements are discussed in this
section: legal and general access control requirements. The
comparison of existing access control models against the
defined requirements is also discussed in this section.
A. Threats in IoT: Access scenarios
Among 8 categories of threats [6] in IoT, software attack
is an obvious cause for concern since IoT users generally use
back-end application to manage and control devices or data.
Software attacks (e.g. system or account hacking) can exploit
entire systems, steal information, alter data, compromise or
damage devices and deny service. Below are some real IoT
scenarios where the threats exist and need to be addressed.
Scenario 1. We take a smart home scenario where home
owner (user) routinely executes commands to smart devices
using smart home application. Each user has an account,
which can be used to access the smart devices. User can, for
example, turn-on or off devices (e.g. smart door), check the
video surveillance and other sensing devices. The interaction
between user and smart devices has been happening in the
more or less precise time interval, which creates an access
pattern. Suppose that there is a situation where account is
hacked and malicious user executes commands on devices in
the strange way (e.g. turn-off CCTV when user is not at home
). User has never executed such command when he is not at
home. In such situation, how system intelligently react to such
strange behaviour and prevent malicious user from executing
those commands? In this example, we see that there is a
level of risk associated with access permission if granted, the
jeopardy of home safety. The access control system should
be able to detect the risk and reacts accordingly.
Scenario 2. The second scenario is related to smart car in
IoT context. In April 2015, Cyber security experts Charlie
Miller and Chris Valasek 1 revealed a software flaw that
allowed them to take control of a Jeep Cherokee on the
move – all from a laptop computer at home. Hacking into
the Jeep’s electronics through the entertainment system, they
were able to change the vehicle’s speed, alter its braking
capability, and manipulate the radio and windscreen wipers.
In this kind of scenario, if the risk-aware is taken out of
context and traditional access control, that is not able to
detect the present risk, is used, system is not able to prevent
malicious user from executing the dangerous action, for
instance, suddenly increasing or dropping the vehicle speed.
The improper change of vehicle speed can have fatal result.
Scenario 3. The third scenario concerns the smart healthcare
system where personal and private information are processing.
This areas of IoT requires high level data protection compared
with other application domains [6]. For example, a system
allowing physician to observe the daily health condition of
patient or a device allowing to trace the movement of patient
in house or healthcare institution. We can take a scenario
of patient or elderly people tracking system, which provides
the whereabouts information of a person.. In this system,
a device is attached to a person and his physical location
is reported to system. In a scenario where the system is
hacked, hacker can get the information from the system and
1https://betanews.com/2015/11/30/the-security-risks-of-iot-devices/
secretly track down the movement of the person. There is
a risk, in this scenario, it concerns the personal safety (e.g.
kidnapping).
In traditional access control, the access permission is
assigned to a subject (user), which is authenticated by the
username and password or other type of user’s credential.
Once user is authenticated, he can access resources (or
devices) based on the pre-defined access control policy. In
case of user credential is hacked, hacker impersonates the
actual user and system could not detect without the help
of intelligent system. This comes to the need of risk-aware
system where system is able to estimate risk using some kind
of machine learning techniques or other relevant methods [15]
and then reacts to user’s access request in accordance with
a given situation although user is successfully authenticated.
This risk-aware adds another level of control to resources,
hence, making the system more secure and attack-aware.
Security myths around connected devices are plentiful
[6], however, we provide three scenarios above in order to
illustrate the importance of having risk-aware access control
to devices as well as data pertaining to them.
B. Legal requirements
The objective of this work is to explore the scope of the
major privacy issues raised by the IoT system in general. We
identify the major legal challenges. These main challenges
are seen through, amongst others aspects, for instance,
the European convention on the human rights [11], the
convention for protection of individuals with regard to
automatic processing of personal data, European charter of
fundamental rights [11] and general data protection regulation
(GDPR) to be taken into effect by May 2018 [11]. These
legislations put more emphasis on the use and processing of
personal information and other privacy sensitive information
(e.g health information). The privacy protection becomes a
compulsory requirements when creating any system dealing
with personal information, for instance, in GDPR [11], the
concept of privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default [11] are
the two major requirements when developing system dealing
or processing personal information. Below, we provide the
main requirements for personal data processing.
• Purpose. To prevent excessive use of data, user should
only collect information for a specific purpose.
• Consent/Access. Data should never be transferred to a
third party without clear approval of owner.
• Accountability. Data owner should be informed when
personal data is processed.
• Safeguards. If IoT system is connected with third party
entity such as cloud services, these providers must
ensure that data safety is properly installed.
These legal requirements must be incorporated into the design
of access control model in order to ensure the compliance
with laws. Based on that vision and access scenarios in
Section II.A, we propose the access control requirements in
Section II.C.
Figure 1. Access Control Requirements for IoT system
C. Access control requirements
The services, such as home monitoring, home automation,
home security and smart health enable user control over
a wide range of services by means of end-user devices.
These transformations have introduced a wide variety of
new risks. The potential for malicious activities ranges from
mischief to crime and malicious hacking. The third party
sensor can gather and monitor private data which can lead
to burglary or any other form of troubles. Therefore, these
unauthorised access needs to be checked. To securely control
the unauthorised access requires the well-designed access
control policy that takes into account all possible security
risks. The model based on which the policy is defined must
be able to respond to all the requirements and constraints
under such environment. Based on our studies on legal and
security issues, we classify the access control requirements
into five main categories as following (see Figure 1).
1) General/usability. In general, access control system
should be extensible, interoperable and easy to manage given
the fast-advancing of IoT system and heterogeneity of devices
and system.
2) Privacy. Future access control model should also support
privacy protection given that large number of IoT scenarios
are dealing with personal information directly or indirectly.
3) Security. Several security features must be embedded in
the model such as forging issue, attack resistance, attack
resilience, adaptive and risk-aware. Adaptive and risk-aware
are two of the most important features required in IoT system
since IoT promotes the concept of openness and collaboration.
Openness with connected world is very susceptible to attack
since it provides more attacking opportunities.
Table I
COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT EXISTING AC MODELS AGAINST
REQUIREMENTS
4) Semantics/policy. Most of access and usage scenarios in
IoT are complex. The control of access in complex scenarios
requires fine-grained access control policy with high level of
expressiveness. A number of access constraints may also be
needed to restrict the access to devices or data. In some IoT
access scenarios, especially in smart healthcare and smart
home, the privilege and delegation concepts are required. For
example, in smart healthcare, physician needs a delegation
right granted by patient or a special privilege to access data
generated from health device.
5) Implementation. Major IoT scenarios deals with real-
time or near real-time data (data from environmental sensors),
hence, it is important to have very fast processing access
control system. However, most of IoT devices constraint with
power. Optimising the power usage is also important.
D. Comparison between different AC models
In this section, we compare standard access control models
against the requirements we defined in previous section.
Discretionary access control (DAC) [9] is an access control
model that the restriction of access to objects is done based
on the identity of subjects to which they belong. The controls
are discretionary in the sense that a subject with certain access
permission is capable of passing that permission on to any
other subjects. One implementation of DAC is ACL. DAC
lacks of some features required in IoT (see Table I), such as
scalability, expressiveness, granularity and privacy.
Mandatory access control (MAC) [9] refers to a type of AC
model by which the system constrains the ability of a subject
to perform some sort of operation to an object. In MAC,
subjects and objects each have a set of security attributes
and when a subject makes an attempt to access an object,
an authorisation rule enforced by the system examines these
security attributes and then the decision can be made whether
the access is granted or not. MAC supports expressiveness
and granularity, but it does not have the concept of privacy
and risk-aware. Another disadvantage of MAC exists in the
complexity of the configuration, since for each object’s and
subject’s security attributes must be determined. This tends to
be very difficult for the system that works with large number
of users and resources like IoT.
RBAC [9] is a policy neutral access control mechanism
defined around roles and privileges. The components of
RBAC, such as role-permissions, user-role and role-role
relationships make it simple to perform user assignments.
RBAC can be used to facilitate administration of security in
large organisations with hundreds of users and thousands of
permissions. Although traditional RBAC has the advantages
over other existing models, such as DAC and MAC, it still
lacks of some features, such as expressiveness and privacy
expression. Moreover, it does not have the concept of risk-
aware in its core model.
OrBAC [9] supports the control of data as well as user in
system like organisation structure and access permission is
granted based on user’s role in that organisation. In addition,
it can also express the access permission in contextual
environment, role and data hierarchy, separation of duties
as well as permission transfer, but there is no concept of
privacy and risk-aware in core OrBAC.
P-RBAC [9] is an extension of the model RBAC, which
provides complete support for expressing highly complex
privacy-related policies. Its focus is to protect personally
identifiable information and as such privacy-sensitive, taking
into account characteristics, such as goals (purposes), condi-
tions and obligations. P-RBAC has all of RBAC’s features,
but it does not support risk-aware expression.
Traditional access control models, such as DAC, MAC
and RBAC are designed to be used in different contexts,
some of their features match to our defined requirements, but
some required features are missing. Given the IoT scenarios
in Section II.A and the AC requirements in Section II.C,
we argue that risk-aware feature should be incorporated in
the model to fully address the access control issues in those
scenarios.
III. RISK MODEL
Risk can be interpreted as a probability of threat of damage,
loss, or any other negative occurrence that is caused by
external or internal vulnerabilities, and that may be avoided
through preemptive action [8]. In our risk model, each risk
is associated with a risk-threshold, risk-evaluation function
and the enforcement methods. We define a risk-threshold is a
maximum risk tolerant that access control system is willing
to accept when granting access request, and what kind of
enforcement is required if risky access is permitted.
• Let R be a set of risks (r).
• Let T be a set of risk thresholds (t) where t 2 [0, 1].
• Let O be a set of risk avoidance enforcement Obligation
(o) where O is some obligations that user or system
needs to fulfil if a risky access permission is granted.
• Let F be a set of risk assessment functions where f 2 F .
Risk assessment function is a method used to evaluate
the associated-risk. This function returns the probability
of risk associated with the permission.
Definition 1: Risk expression
Let R be a set of risk (r), where r 2 R. “r” has the finite
domain of possible values, denoted as D where d 2 D, d =
[0, 1]. “r” is equipped with the relational operators (Oprs)
“ =, 6=, , and  ”. The risk expression of r has the form
(r opr d).
let r1 and r2 are two risk variables. Then, (r1 ^ r2) or
(r1 _ r2) are multiple risks conditioned in policy.
Definition 2: risk avoidance enforcement Obligation
expression
Let O be a set of risk avoidance enforcement obligation
variables (o), where o 2 O . “o” has the finite domain of
possible values, denoted as B where b 2 B. “o” is equipped
with the relational operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”.
The condition of “o” has the form (o opr b). For example,
user notification obligation has the form: notify = true.
If t2 is the risk threshold, we can formulate our risk to
access permission assignment as following.
(p, ((r  t2 , f), o))
The above expression is read as a permission “p” is granted
if the risk “r” assessed by risk-assessment function (f) is
less than or equal t2 (risk-assessment threshold) and this
permission is further enforced by obligation “o”. Suppose
that we have U, which is a set of users (u). The user to risk-
aware permission assignment can be formulated as following.
(u, (p, ((r  t2 , f), o)))
Then,
• The request (u, p) is granted if the risk of granting (u,
p) is less than or equal t2. However, the obligation “o”
stated in policy must be fulfilled;
• The request (u, p) is denied if the risk of granting (u,
p) is greater than t2.
The value (t) of risk (r) can be calculated using the
risk-estimation function (f) based on risk-aware information
that can be taken from different sources, such as user
access history, environmental parameters, spatial/temporal
information or information from external system (see Figure
3 for more details). Actually, estimating and managing risk
is a case-by-case study given different nature and type of
risks that may have in IoT system environment, hence, risk-
evaluation function can not be generalised [15].
Example 1: risk-aware access control policy expression
Figure 2. Risk-value calculation architecture
Policy: rule states that user ”Edward” can turn-off the surveil-
lance CCTV through his account by using web application if
the risk-aware-account-hacking-detection (account-hacking)
value is less than 0.2. And system needs to notify to Edward
if the permission is granted. Then, we can express the policy
as following.
(Edward, ((turn-off, CCTV), ((account-hacking  0.2),
risk-aware-hacking-detection), notify=true)))
Although this approach increases the complexity of policy
decision process at permission level, it is more secure than
other existing access control models [9], which usually do
not adopt the risk assessment in policy level, instead, use a
global risk management at authentication level. For example,
in IoT usage scenarios, user account may be hacked and
malicious user may command on device in the abnormal and
unreasonable way. If risk assessment is done at authentication
level, it is not able to address this issue since hacker is already
successfully authenticated.
This risk model can be incorporated with other existing
access control models. In this paper, we extend attribute-
based access control and P-RBAC to support our risk model.
The idea of extending this two models is that ABAC and
P-RBAC are the two well known access control models that
are being used widely in many systems [9]. ABAC is well
known for its ability to express fine-grained and complex
policies and it is easy to understand and manage. The well
known existing access control engine such as XACML is
also implemented based on ABAC model. ABAC is good
to be used in large number of IoT access scenarios in the
domains, such as entertainment, traffic control, agriculture
and transportation [3]. However, for some scenarios dealing
with privacy sensitive or personal information, such as
healthcare, smart home or surveillance system, P-RBAC is
more appropriate since P-RBAC allows to express complex
privacy sensitive policy with the support of condition, purpose
and obligation.
IV. ADAPTIVE RISK-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL
We present two extended access control models: adaptive
risk-aware ABAC and adaptive risk-aware P-RBAC.
A. Adaptive risk-aware attributed-based access control
ABAC [9] defines an access control model whereby access
rights are granted to users through the use of policies which
combine attributes together. ABAC is becoming well known
and considered as a “next generation” authorisation model
because it provides dynamic, fine-grained, context-aware and
intelligent access control. ABAC uses attributes as building
blocks in a structured language that defines access control
rules and describes access requests. Attributes are sets of
labels or properties that can be used to describe all the entities
that must be considered for authorisation purposes. As shown
in Figure 3, the traditional ABAC model consists of 4 main
entities (e.g. subject, action, resource and environment )
where each entity may hold multiple attributes.
• Subject attributes describe the user attempting the access
e.g. age, clearance, department, role, job title...
• Action attributes describe the action being attempted
e.g. read, delete, view, approve...
• Resource (or object) attributes describe the object
being accessed e.g. the object type (medical record,
bank account...), the department, the classification or
sensitivity, the location...
• Contextual (environment) attributes deal with time,
location or dynamic aspects of the access control
scenario. For more details about ABAC, see in [9].
To formally incorporate the risk-aware concept into ABAC
model, we propose the extension like shown in Figure 4.
The risk-aware info (information) entity is responsible for
providing the risk-value estimation at the time of request.
The new extended ABAC policy should contain not only
user, action, resource and environmental attributes, but also
the risk-aware attribute(s).
Risk-aware information is considered as separate entity
from environment attributes in ABAC model because in
traditional ABAC, environment attribute is any information
regarding the context of the access that might be used in
making the access decision, such as, time, network or spacial
context whereas risk-aware information is the information
from different sources used for estimating the risk associated
with request. In most cases, risk-aware information is a
complex data sets that generally come from databases (e.g.
access history) or external information system.
Extended ABAC policy expression
• Let U be a set of users (u);
• Let A be a set of actions (a);
• Let C be a set of resources (c);
• Let E be a set of environment attributes (e).
The permission assignment in ABAC is expressed as (u,
p) where p is a permissions on resource. p=(a, c, e). The
risk-aware ABAC policy expression is as follows.
Figure 3. Adaptive and risk-aware ABAC
p= ((a, c, e), ((r , f), o))
Refer to Section III (risk model) for more detail. The
complete risk-aware ABAC policy considering subject (or
user) attribute can be expressed as follows.
p= (u, (a, c, e), ((r , f), o))
Definition 3: ABAC environmental variable expression
Let E be a set of environmental attributes (e), where e 2 E .
“e” has the finite domain of possible values, denoted as N
where n 2 N . “e” is equipped with the relational operators
(Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of “e” has the form
(e opr n). let e1 and e2 be two environmental variables. Then,
(e1 ^ e2) or (e1 _ e2) are multiple environmental variables
conditioned in policy. For example, time   20:10:00.
Example 2: risk-aware ABAC policy expression
Policy: rule states data user ”David” can open the smart door
through his account by using smart application in between
17:00:00 and 20:00:00 if the risk-aware-malicious-detection
(malicious-user) value is less than 0.4. And system needs
to prove that user is really David by letting David answer
the secret question registered during account creation. Then,
based on definition 1 and 2, we can express the policy as
following.
(David, ((open, smart-door, (time   17 : 00 : 00) ^
(time  20 : 00 : 00)), ((malicious-user  0.4), risk-aware-
malicious-detection), prove(question)=true)))
B. Adaptive risk-aware privacy-aware role-based access
control
Taking into consideration different access scenarios and
risks associated with them in smart home, healthcare and
other privacy sensitive systems, we propose an extended
version of privacy-aware role-based access control (P-RBAC)
[10]. It is called “adaptive risk-aware privacy-aware role-
based access control”. P-RBAC is an extension of the model
RBAC [9]. It provides complete support for expressing highly
complex privacy policies. Its focus is to protect personally
identifiable information and as such privacy-sensitive, taking
into account characteristics, such as purposes, conditions and
obligations. In P-RBAC, data permissions are assigned to
roles for a specific purpose. Conditions are the mechanisms
to precisely define the authority over data to a specific role.
Obligations are the necessary actions to be made before the
actions on content can be exercised.
For adaptive risk-aware P-RBAC, two more entities are
added to be able to address the risk associated with access
request at permission level. They are the “risks” and “risk-
avoidance enforcement”. The “risks” entity is used to express
the level of risk tolerance that a policy can support. “risk-
avoidance enforcement” is some forms of obligation or duties
or actions that user or system needs to perform before or
after the request is granted. This risk-avoidance enforcement
is similar to “obligation”, but it is more complex since it
may contain a lengthy procedure that user or system needs
to follow to avoid risk.
Figure 4. Adaptive, risk-aware, privacy-aware RBAC
Adaptive and risk-aware P-RBAC policy expression
• Let U be a set of users (u);
• Let L be a set of user roles (l);
• Let A be a set of actions (a);
• Let C be a set of resources (c);
• Let I be a set of conditions (i) ;
• Let Pu be a set of purpose (pu);
• Let O be a set of obligation (o);
• Let K be a set of risk-avoidance enforcement (k).
1) User to role assignment (UA): UA = (u, l)
2) Data Permission (DP) assignment: DP = (a, c)
3) Privacy Data Permission (PDP) assignment:
PDP = (DP, (l, pu, o)) or ((a, c), (l, pu, o))
4) adaptive, Risk-aware, Privacy-aware Data Permission
(RPDP) assignment:
RPDP = (PDP, ((r, f), k))) or ((((a, c), (l, pu, o)), ((r,
f), k)))
5) Role to RPDP can be expressed as: (l, ((((a, c), (l, pu,
o)), ((r, f), k))))
For risk-aware function expression, see Section III.
Definition 4: Condition expression
Let I be a set of conditions (i), where i 2 I . “i” has
the finite domain of possible values, denoted as J where
j 2 J . “i” is equipped with the relational operators (Oprs)
“ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of “i” has the form (i opr
j). let i1 and i2 be two conditional variables. Then, (i1 ^ ei)
or (i1 _ i2) are also the conditions. For example, time  
20:10:00.
Definition 5: Obligation expression
Let O be a set of obligation variables (o), where o 2 O .
“o” has the finite domain of possible values, denoted as B
where b 2 B. “o” is equipped with the relational operators
(Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of “o” has the
form (o opr b). For example, user notification obligation has
the form: notify = true.
Definition 6: risk avoidance enforcement expression
Let K be a set of risk avoidance enforcement variables (k),
where k 2 K . “k” has the finite domain of possible values,
denoted as H where h 2 H . “k” is equipped with the
relational operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The risk
avoidance enforcement variable of “k” has the form (k opr
h). For example, user notification obligation has the form:
notify = true.
Example 3: risk-aware P-RBAC policy expression
Policy: a rule states that every user in role “physician” can
read heart-pulse from patient’s smart wearable health-device
for purpose of patient-health-follow-up whenever he wants
given that the risk-estimation value is less than 60%. If the
risk-value is in between 60% and 90%, physician needs to
prove his identity by answering special question registered at
the time of creating account. Physician needs also to notify
patient every access.
Policy expression:
• DP = (read, heart-pulse)
• PDP = (DP, (patient-health-follow-up, notify)) or ((read,
hearth-pulse), (patient-health-follow-up, notify))
• RPDP = (PDP, ((60%  r ^ r  90%), prove-
identity))) or ((((read, hearth-pulse), (patient-health-
follow-up, notify)), ((60%  r ^ r  90%), prove-
identity)))
• Role to RPDP can be expressed as: (Physician,
((((read, hearth-pulse), (patient-health-follow-up, no-
tify)), ((60%  r ^ r  90%), prove-identity))))
Remarks: why we do not use “condition” entity to express
risk? This is because the two entities have different nature.
Conditions are environmental or system-oriented decision
factors. Condition predicates evaluate current environmental
or system status to check whether relevant requirements
are satisfied or not and return either ‘true’ or ‘false’ [9].
Condition variables cannot be mutable since conditions are
not under direct control of individual subjects. Some exam-
ples of condition requirements include current local time for
accessible time period (e.g., business hours), current location
for accessible location checking. Risk is the information from
different sources used for estimating the risk associated with
request. In most cases, risk-aware information is a complex
data sets that generally come from databases (e.g. access
history) or external information system.
In Extended P-RPAC, there are obligation and risk avoid-
ance enforcement. Obligation is used to enforce overall access
control policy whereas risk avoidance enforcement is used
to prevent or minimise risk associated with request at policy
decision level. Obligation at policy level is generally executed
at Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) while risk avoidance
enforcement is executed by a module at Policy Decision
Point (PDP).
V. ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the adaptive risk-aware ABAC
and its implementation in XACML policy engine [14]. For
risk-aware P-RBAC, we consider it in our future work.
A. Risk-aware ABAC system architecture
As shown in Figure 5, the system consists of the following
modules.
1) User is a Man Machine Interface acting as the inter-
mediate layer between system and physical person.
2) PEP handles request from user and forwards it to policy
decision point for further policy validation.
3) Recourses are the digital assets that are securely stored
in system storage.
4) Obligation is a module handling different obligations
that user or system needs to fulfil (e.g. notification).
5) PDP is responsible for validating the access control
policy. It consists of three modules.
a) Environmental attribute validation (EAV) is re-
sponsible for retrieving the environmental infor-
mation from policy information point (PIP) or
external information system.
b) OSAV is responsible for validating the object’s
and subject’s attributes. These attributes are gen-
erally retrieved from PIP.
c) Risk-estimation is responsible for providing the
risk estimation value, which is calculated using
risk-estimation engine that is designed to support
different risk-estimation functions.
6) Risk-estimation engine is responsible for calculating
the risk-value based on defined risk-estimation function
and the risk-aware information.
7) Risk-avoidance enforcement is responsible for enforc-
ing some actions aiming to minimise or prevent the
risk. This process is complex and sometime requires a
lengthy procedure that user or system needs to follow.
For example, if system detects that user is suspicious,
system may require user to prove his identity either by
answer question (question and answer registered when
creating account) or use other credential to prove.
Figure 5. Adaptive, risk-aware ABAC Architecture
B. Implementation
In order to test our concept, we implement risk-aware
ABAC in XACML. Some scenarios in smart home are used
for validation and testing. We also develop the risk-estimation
engine in Java and define the risk-estimation function for
user account hacking scenario.
Risk and solution: account hacking and access pattern
analysis. We take scenario 1 in Section II.A. We address
the account hacking issue in smart home scenario. How
to make an intelligent access control system being able to
prevent hacker from executing harmful commands once he
gets access to user’s account.
A solution to tackle the above problem is to use user’s
access history as source of information for access pattern
extraction. Then, this pattern is used as the reference for
access permission decision. The access pattern can be defined
based on relationship between different entities in access
request and policy, such as user, action, devices, time interval
and other environment and contextual constraints if any. With
such information registered in access history we can use them
to analyse the association between those entities. It is worth
noting that we can add other parameters if we have in the
association, however, in our example, we take only user,
action, device, time as the entities.
Our idea is to find the relationship between user’s request
and time at which user often requests to execute the
commands. Once the pattern is determined, we can rule
out the request that does not fall into the defined pattern as
unlikely from real user.
• Let U be a set of users (u) where u 2 U
• Let A be a set of actions (a) where a 2 A
• Let V be a set of devices (v) where v 2 V
• Let M be a set of times (m) where m 2M
Given a user’s request (u, a, v) and time m, determine the
association between those entities. We propose to use associ-
ation rule learning algorithm to determine their association.
Association rule learning (ARL) is a rule-based machine
learning method for discovering interesting relations between
variables in large databases. It is intended to identify strong
rules [13] discovered in databases using some measures of
interestingness [13]. ARL is generally used to analyse the
relationship between products in large-scale transaction data
recorded by point-of-sale (POS) systems in supermarkets.
However, it is also used in other areas, which require to
determine the relationship between entities in the database.
Definition: let X and Y be two set of entities (or item
sets) where X \ Y=0. X ) Y is an association of X and Y.
Let S be a set of transactions of a given database.
Confidence of rule (X ) Y ) is an indication of how
often the rule has been found to be true.
The confidence value of a rule, X ) Y , with respect to
a set of transactions S, is the proportion of the transactions
that contains X which also contains Y.
Confidence is defined as: Conf(X ) Y ) = supp(X[Y )supp(X)
Support (or supp) is an indication of how frequently
the itemset appears in the dataset. The support of X
with respect to S is defined as the proportion of trans-
actions “s” in the dataset which contains the itemset X.
supp(X) = |{s2S;X✓s}||S|
Apply ARL for risk value calculation. Suppose we have
two sets of entities X and Y. X contains (u, a, v) and Y
contains (m). We want to find the relationship between user
Table II
EXAMPLE: USER ACCESS HISTORY
performs action on device and time that action is executed.
Since rule confidence is an indication of how often the
rule has been found to be true, this means that, the higher
confidence the lower risk. Thus, the risk value is defined as
the reverse of rule confidence value. 1 Conf(X ) Y )(see
Section III).
Example 4: risk-value calculation
Suppose that we have the transactions like in Table II and
a request (Edward, turn-off, CCTV, 6PM). Calculate the
risk associated with the permission allowing Edward to
turn off CCTV at 6PM given his past access history in
Table II. Conf((Edward, turn off, CCTV )) 6PM)=
supp((Edward,turn off,CCTV )[(6PM))
supp(Edward,turn off,CCTV ) =
3
3 , hence, the risk of
allowing Edward to turn off CCTV at 6PM is 1-1=0.
There is one drawback for this approach that is we need to
have a reasonable size of access history in order to define
the risk threshold to be used in access control policy. This
approach can not be applied in case of new user without
access history.
Testing data set. In order to test the risk-estimation
for account hacking scenario, we need access history. We
generate a simulated access history for 50000, 100000 and
1000000 transactions (records) stored in the access log file
with the data structure like in Figure 7.
Performance evaluation. The idea is to evaluate the
general performance of risk-aware ABAC with the account-
hacking risk estimation algorithms shown above. Since we
use access history as the source of information for risk-
estimation, larger access history can introduce larger delay
for access control policy evaluation. Thus, it is important
to observe the policy evaluation processing time given
different sizes of access history. We used 60 access control
policies expressed in XACML policy language for testing. We
simulated 50 different access requests and find the average
policy evaluation processing time. We tested our system in
Macbook air 1.3 Ghz Intel Core i5, memory 8 GB 1600
MHz DDR3. The result is shown in table III.
As expected, the policy evaluation processing time is
increased in accordance with the size of the access log.
In case of load system, this issue can be a big challenge.
Table III
POLICY DECISION PROCESSING TIME
Experiment No Log size Average processing time
1 50000 records 156 milliseconds
2 100000 records 203 milliseconds
3 1000000 records 580 milliseconds
However, there are two possible ways for reducing the policy
evaluation time. The first option is to minimise the size of the
access-log; another is to increase the computational power
of the system (e.g; parallel computing).
In order to minimise the size of access-log, we need
to minimise the size of observation interval. Our proposed
solution is to divide a large observation internal into many
smaller intervals (equal size). Then, we define the risk
threshold of each interval. The final risk threshold value,
which is used in policy, is an average of the risk threshold
values from the smaller intervals. With this method, the size
of access log used to calculate the risk value is the size of
access log of one interval (the most recent access-log), not
the entire access-log. For example, instead of using many
years access-log, we can use a year or a month access-log
to evaluate the rule (policy).
VI. RELATED WORK
Although IoT field is rapidly gaining attention, there are
a few researches focusing on access control in IoT [1] [5]
[4] [2]. Most researches suggested existing access control
models [9] to address access control in IoT. Below are some
existing researches related to our work.
Mehdi et al [2] introduced a formal theoretical model for
IoT collaboration AC model based on attribute and role based
access control model. They also built data sharing framework
based on the proposed model. Authors used the traditional
ABAC and RBAC to address the access control challenges
in IoT without considering risk in decision factor.
Blase et al [4] did a comprehensive survey of the current
state of access control model for smart devices in homes.
Based on their assessment of different access control models,
they proposed to use role-based access control model.
However, their study is very narrow by focusing only to smart
home. This may not be suitable for other domain application
such as surveillance system or most importantly healthcare
domain where data needs high degree of protection given its
values and sensitivity. Thus, fine-grained and complex policy
expression is required.
Bruce et al [1] conducted a security analysis and improve-
ments of authentication and access control in the Internet
of Things. The authors proposed the improvement protocol
for authentication and access control by introducing the
cryptographic key in both authentication and access control
processes. RBAC is author’s primary study in the paper.
Authors also built their system to validate its performance
and the result indicates that the improved protocol possesses
many advantages against popular attack [6], and achieves
better efficiency at low communication cost.
Rahul et al [3] proposed an access control model for home
automation devices, which offers the capabilities to identify
and connect physical devices into a unified secure system.
The authors proposed to use Access Control List (ACL) as
the access control security model to manage access to devices.
Although ACL is simple to both understand and implement,
it is not suitable for complex and fine-grained access control
policies, which are needed in most of IoT scenarios.
Ricardo et al [5] proposed a model-based security toolkit
for IoT, which is integrated in a management framework
for IoT devices, and supports specification and efficient
evaluation of security policies to enable the protection of user
data. The authors’s work is applied to a smart city scenario.
The access control model, the authors used for building the
frame work, is the improved RBAC model where the concept
of trust and trust relationship is introduced.
Khalid et al [8] proposed a framework for Risk-aware
Role based Access Control. The authors used different levels
of risk control on RBAC model from user to role assignment,
RBAC session and permission assignment. Our proposed
model focuses only on permission level since it is designed
to be incorporated with other models. Unlike that of ours,
authors proposed a risk model specifically for RBAC.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on the issue of access control in
IoT. We introduced the general AC requirements taking into
account the aspects of security and privacy. We also provided
a short discussion and comparison of existing access control
models against our defined set of requirements. Furthermore,
the risk model and the extension of ABAC and P-RBAC
to support our risk model are also presented. Finally, we
propose the risk-aware ABAC system architecture and its
implementation in XACML for proof-of-concept. Our future
work is to look at the implementation of risk-aware P-RBAC
and its deployment in IOT system, smart home in particular.
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